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ESSAY
Judgment as a Matter of Law on
Punitive Damages
Colleen P. Murphy*
Under traditional doctrine, a court that considers a jury's award of damages to be
excessive generally has two choices: order a new trial or offer a remittitur to the plaintiff, who
may decline it in favor of a new trial. Federal courts of appeals are divided as to whether this
traditional doctrine applies to excessive punitive awards, with some courts reducing such
awards outright and entering judgment as a matter of law on the reduced amounts. After
identifying the limited circumstances in which judgment as a matter of law is appropriate on
awards of damages, the author argues that punitive damages fall within the general rule that a
court may not reduce a jury award outright.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A federal court that considers a jury's award of damages to be
excessive has limited options under the Seventh Amendment It may
order a new trial, either of the whole case or of damages alone.'
Alternatively, it may offer the plaintiff a remittitur, whereby the court
compels the plaintiff to choose between accepting a reduction of the
excessive award or proceeding with a new trial.3 The Supreme Court
has indicated that the Seventh Amendment generally does not permit a
court to reduce outright a jury's award.4 Nonetheless, exceptions to
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. J.D. 1986, Yale
Law School; B.A. 1983, University of Virginia. I am grateful to Michael Yelnosky for his
comments on this Essay.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than
according to the rules of the common law.").
2. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a).
3. See 12 JAMEs WM. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERALPRAClCE § 59.13[2][g][iii][A], at
59-81 (3d ed. 1999).
4. See Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208, 211 (1998) (per curiam);
Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22,27-29 (1889).
459
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this general rule exist. Courts have reduced damages when a legal rule
invalidated an identifiable amount of the jury's award.5 Courts also
have altered jury awards as a matter of law when the facts could
support no other result-i.e., when the plaintiff sought an award that
was fixed at a sum certain or that could be made certain by
computation.
6
With respect to punitive damages, federal appellate courts have
split as to the proper procedure for reducing an excessive jury award.
Several courts follow the traditional rule that the plaintiff should be
granted the choice between proceeding with a new trial or accepting
the amount that the reviewing court has determined to be the lawful
limit.7  Other courts, upon determining the limit of an appropriate
punitive award, have directed entry ofjudgment as a matter of law on
that amount.' These latter courts generally have given little or no
5. See, e.g., N.Y., Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Estill, 147 U.S. 591, 619-22 (1893); see
infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
7. See Thome v. Welk Inv., Inc., 197 F.3d 1205, 1212 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that
the district court erred in ordering remittitur on compensatory and punitive damages without
the plaintiff's consent); Riley v. Kurtz, No. 98-1077, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24341, at *25
(6th Cir. Sept. 28, 1999) (involving an award deemed excessive under nonconstitutional
standards); Deffenbaugh-Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581,598 (5th Cir. 1998)
(examining an award deemed excessive under nonconstitutional standards), vacated sub nom.
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 169 F.3d 215 (5th Cir.), and reinstated by 182 F.3d 333
(5th Cir. 1999); Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1241, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 1998)
(involving an award deemed excessive under nonconstitutional standards); Cont'l Trend Res.,
Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 643 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating, after concluding that the
punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive, that "[t]o avoid any conflict with
the Seventh Amendment, the preferable [course] is to afford the party... the option of either
accepting the remittitur of the punitive damages award or a new trial on that issue" (quoting
Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1258-59 (9th Cir. 1993))); Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d
805, 812-13 (2d Cir. 1996) (involving an award that the court seemingly reviewed under both
constitutional and nonconstitutional standards); Atlas Food Sys. & Servs., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l
Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587,593 (4th Cir. 1996) (involving an award deemed excessive under
nonconstitutional standards); McKinnon v. City of Berwyn, 750 F.2d 1383, 1391-92 (7th Cir.
1984) (reversing the trial court's reduction of damages where no option for a new trial was
offered to the plaintiff); see also Mahoney v. Can. Dry Bottling Co., No. 94-CV-2924(FB),
1998 WL 231082, at *6-*9 (E.D.N.Y. May 7, 1998) (recognizing the plaintiffs right to
choose between a remittitur amount and the defendant's motion for a new trial); Kim v. Dial
Serv. Int'l, Inc., No. 96 CIV.3327(DLC), 1997 WL 458783, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1997),
affd, 159 F.3d 1347 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1140 (1999); Leab v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.95-5690, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8868, at *53 (E.D. Pa. June 23, 1997).
8. See, e.g., InterMed. Supplies, Ltd. v. EBI Med. Sys., Inc., 181 F.3d 446,463,470
(3d Cir. 1999) (remanding so that the district court could "enter a judgment for punitive
damages in the amount of $1 million," down from a $100.6 million jury award already
reduced by the district court via a remittitur to $50 million); Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g,
Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1330-31 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding that a court may enterjudgment for a
constitutionally reduced award without offering the plaintiffa new trial); Kimzey v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 107 F.3d 568, 576-78 (8th Cir. 1997) (directing the district court to reduce the
punitive damages award to an amount determined by an appellate court as reasonable under
460 [Vol. 75:459
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attention to whether such an outright reduction is consistent with the
Seventh Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit is the only court to
provide a detailed rationale for its conclusion that it could reduce
outright a punitive damages award, and its ruling was limited to
awards that are excessive under federal due process.9
This Essay suggests that judgment as a matter of law on damages
should be limited to the same sets of circumstances in which judgment
as a matter of law is permissible on liability-that is, when a legal rule
dictates a certain outcome or when there is only one conclusion on the
facts that a reasonable jury could reach. Entering judgment as a matter
of law on punitive damages does not fall within either category. 10 No
legal rule exists to inform the court of the precise limit on punitive
damages, and reasonable juries could reach different conclusions on
the proper amount of relief. Admittedly, there is some intuitive appeal
to the argument that plaintiffs should not get a second chance at
proving damages when a reviewing court has determined the lawful
limit of a punitive award. The thrust of long-established remittitur
doctrine, however, is that a plaintiff should have the option to go
before a new jury, in the hope that the plaintiff's proof at the new trial
will justify an award larger than the maximum previously set by the
reviewing court. The option of a new trial-although inefficient and
often rejected by plaintiffs in favor of remittitur-is integral to
preserving the constitutional ideal that juries, rather than judges, are
the principal decision makers on uncertain damages.
state law and rejecting the argument that the plaintiff should be offered the option of a new
trial on punitive damages); Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 207 (1st Cir.
1987) (directing the district court to reduce the punitive damages award to an amount
determined to be reasonable in accordance with prior case law).
9. See Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1331.
10. I have argued elsewhere that the Seventh Amendment should not be interpreted
to require that juries assess punitive damages as an initial matter. See Colleen P. Murphy,
Integrating the ConstitutionalAuthority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
723, 798-804 (1993) [hereinafter Murphy, Constitutional Authority of Juries]; Colleen P.
Murphy, Judicial Assessment of Legal Remedies, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 153, 171-86 (1999)
[hereinafter Murphy, Judicial Assessment]. Others have also suggested that the Seventh
Amendment should not be a bar to judicial assessment of punitive damages. See, e.g., Paul
Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CH. L. REv. 179
(1998) (offering arguments based on policy and the Constitution for why judges should
determine punitive damages). In this Essay, however, I take as a starting point the prevailing
assumption of federal courts that the Seventh Amendment preserves a role for juries in the
assessment of punitive damages. See infra note 61. From that starting point, I argue that the
Amendment does not permit outright reduction of such damages.
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II. NEw TRIAL, REMITnrUR, AND JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
ON DAMAGES
In eighteenth-century England, a judge could not replace a jury
award of uncertain damages with the judge's own assessment of the
proper amount of monetary relief." Rather, the cure for an excessive
or inadequate jury award was a new trial.'2 The Seventh Amendment,
which guarantees in part that "no fact tried by ajury, shall be otherwise
reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law," 3 constitutionalizes this common law rule.
The Supreme Court, however, has upheld some modification of the
common law practice. Since the nineteenth century, the Court has
permitted federal judges to offer remittiturs to plaintiffs.'4 While a
court is obliged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 to order a
new trial when it deems the damages award to be excessive, it is under
no obligation to offer a remittitur.'5
11. See Murphy, Judicial Assessment, supra note 10, at 188-89 (discussing the
historical treatment of excessive jury awards).
12. See id.
13. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
14. See, Gila Valley, Globe & N. Ry. Co. v. Hall, 232 U.S. 94, 103-05 (1914)
(upholding the constitutionality of remittitur); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 29 (1889)
(allowing a court to grant a motion for a new trial, deny the motion, or condition a denial
upon the plaintiffs remitting part of the award); Ark. Valley Land & Cattle Co. v. Mann, 130
U.S. 69, 73-74 (1889) (stating that a remittitur does not "impair the constitutional right of
trial byjury"); Hopkins v. Orr, 124 U.S. 510, 515 (1888) (allowing the verdict to stand if the
plaintiff remitted the excess interest award); N. Pac. RIR. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U.S. 642, 646-
47 (1886) (holding that it was within the court's discretion to offer the plaintiff a remittitur).
But see Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1935) (indicating reservations about the
constitutionality of remittitur, but concluding that "the doctrine would not be reconsidered or
disturbed at this late day"). The most famous early instance of remittitur appeared in an 1822
circuit court decision by Justice Story. See Blunt v. Little, 3 F. Cas. 760, 762 (Story, Circuit
Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No. 1578). Responding to the defendant's argument that the
jury's damage award was excessive and necessitated a new trial, Justice Story ordered that
the action should be submitted to another jury unless the plaintiff was willing to remit a
portion of the damages. Id. (Story, Circuit Justice). Under current Supreme Court doctrine,
if a court considers a jury's award to be inadequate, it may order a new trial, but it may not
increase thejury's award. See Dimick, 293 U.S. at 485-87 (finding that additur-increasing a
jury award as a condition for denying the plaintiff's motion for a new trial-violates the
Seventh Amendment).
15. See 12 MOORE, supra note 3, § 59.13[2][g][i], at 59-75 ("[A] motion for a new
trial on the issue of damages, govemed by Rule 59(a), will be granted when the amount of
the verdict is so unreasonable as to be entirely disproportionate to the plaintiffs injury."). If
the judge considers the jury award to be the product of passion or prejudice, the judge should
not offer a remittitur. Rather, the court should order a new trial because the passion or
prejudice could have affected the jury's findings on liability as well as on damages. I 1
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACrICE AND PROCEDURE § 2815, at 165 (2d ed.
1995).
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Soon after the Supreme Court first upheld the practice of
remittitur, it rejected the argument that a court could reduce outright a
jury award. In Kennon v. Gilmer, involving compensatory damages
for personal injury, the Court ruled that the Seventh Amendment
prohibits a court from "enter[ing] an absolute judgment for any other
sum than that assessed by the jury. 1 6 Instead, if a court wants to
reduce a jury award, it must give the plaintiff the option of rejecting
the reduced amount in favor of a new trial. In a recent per curiam
opinion involving compensatory damages for unlawful discrimination,
Hetzel v. Prince William County, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its
long-held view that the Seventh Amendment does not permit the
outright reduction of an excessive jury award."
One justification for the Court's doctrine is purely historical.
Because the only cure for an excessive jury award prior to the
ratification of the Seventh Amendment was a new trial before a new
jury, the Amendment preserves a plaintiff's right to reject a rernittitur
in favor of a new trial." Another justification for the doctrine is that it
preserves the ideal of the jury as the principal decision maker on the
amount of damages." If judges were able to reduce jury awards
outright, they would become the principal assessors of damages,
relegating the jury to the role of initial assessor only.
As a practical matter, a plaintiff is under significant pressure to
take the reduced amount set by the judge because of the time and cost
of a new trial, as well as the risk that a different jury might reach a
result less favorable to the plaintiff. Moreover, even if the second jury
renders a favorable verdict for the plaintiff, the court may deem that
verdict to be excessive also. This is particularly likely when the judge
at the second trial is the same one who offered a remittitur after the
first trial.
16. 131 U.S. at 29. The Supreme Court held that acourt's reduction of the amount of
a jury's award, "without submitting the case to another jury, or putting the plaintiff to the
election of remitting part of the verdict before rendering judgment for the rest," violated the
Reexamination Clause of the Seventh Amendment. Id. at 27-28.
17. 523 U.S. 208, 210-12 (1998) (per curiam). Hetzel relied primarily on Kennon.
Id. at 211. It also cited Gasperini v. CenterforHumanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,433 (1996), in
which the majority commented that a trial judge's discretion encompasses "overturning
verdicts for excessiveness and ordering a new trial without qualification, or conditioned on
the verdict winner's refusal to agree to a reduction (remittitur)." 523 U.S. at 211. The
Supreme Court in Hetzel invalidated the appellate court's outright reduction of the lower
court award; the prohibition on outright reduction thus applies to both appellate and trial
courts. See id.
18. See Murphy, Constitutional Authority ofJuries, supra note 10, at 767-68.
19. See, e.g., Hetzel, 523 U.S. at 211 (per curiam) (prohibiting a court from
reexamining facts already determined by ajury, under the Seventh Amendment).
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The plaintiff may insist on the constitutional right to a jury
determination of damages, but only at the peril of having to endure
successive new trials. The facts of Atlas Food Systems & Services,
Inc. v. Crane National Vendors, Inc., a 1996 case before the Fourth
Circuit, are illustrative.20 The first jury rendered judgment in favor of
the plaintiff, including a three million dollar punitive damages award.2
The trial court indicated that it would order a new trial on punitive
damages unless the plaintiff agreed to a reduced punitive damages
award of one million dollars.22 The plaintiffrejected the remittitur, and
the court ordered a new trial.23 At the second trial, the jury awarded
four million dollars in punitive damages.24 The court again stated that
it would order a new trial unless the plaintiff accepted one million
dollars and it warned: "If they want to keep going for more, they can
do that. And if they don't produce any... different testimony, I guess
this court will be required to continue to rule as it sees the facts and the
law."'25 A rational plaintiff would thus reject a remittitur in favor of a
new trial for one of two primary reasons: to gain a favorable
settlement with the defendant before the new trial26 or to attempt the
daunting task of presenting proof at the new trial that would justify an
award greater than the reduced amount the reviewing court offered
after the first trial.
This raises why plaintiffs should have a second chance at proving
their case on damages, with all the inefficiency that entails.27 A
20. 99 F.3d 587 (4th Cir. 1996).
21. Id. at 591.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 593.
26. The Fourth Circuit, on remand from the Supreme Court's decision in Heizel,
noted the strategic use to which a plaintiff might put the option of a new trial:
[I]t seemed to us that permitting the plaintiff to retain her finding of liability
against the defendants and retry only the issue of damages would create an
affirmative incentive for the plaintiff unilaterally to force the defendant to proceed
through trial after trial, ad infinitum, until the plaintiff received the damages award
she wished (through forced settlement if not through jury verdict).
In re Bd. of County Supervisors, 143 F.3d 835, 841 (4th Cir. 1998).
27. Because of the costs and risks entailed in refusing a remittitur and opting for a
new trial, some plaintiffs might wish that the court had the power to enter judgment as a
matter of law on a reduced amount. Such ajudgment would be "final," and thus immediately
appealable. By contrast, if the plaintiff refuses a remittitur, any appeal on the ground that the
court erred in setting aside the original verdict as excessive must await the outcome of the
second trial. See I1 WRIGHr ET AL., supra note 15, § 2815, at 169. If a plaintiff accepts a
reduced amount in lieu of a new trial, it generally may not appeal the court's determination
that the original verdict was excessive. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648,
649 (1977).
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comparison to court review of jury determinations of liability is
helpful on this question. A court may enter judgment as a matter of
law on liability only when a legal rule dictates the outcome or when
the court finds that there is but one conclusion a reasonable jury could
reach on the facts.2" The practice of setting aside an erroneous jury
verdict and entering judgment on the court's view of liability can be
justified by the notion that a jury does not have the authority to violate
governing legal rules or standards.2 9 The question of liability is a yes
or no proposition, and it makes sense that a court could reverse a jury
decision that is clearly wrong. If the court believes that a jury verdict
in favor of the plaintiff is merely against the weight of the evidence,
however, the cure is a new trial, with the plaintiff having a second
chance to prove liability.3" In cases where reasonable people might
differ over the outcome, this second chance retains the jury as the
principal decision maker on liability.
Just as a plaintiff has a second chance at proving liability in cases
where reasonable people might disagree, so too, should the plaintiff be
offered a second chance at proving damages when reasonable people
might disagree as to the amount." In most cases of noneconomic or
punitive damages, reasonable people will disagree about the proper
amount because such damages are not susceptible of precise
measurement. Thus, a reviewing court cannot be sure of the
28. For example, the court has the power to dismiss the complaint for failure to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6),(h). The court's decision
to dismiss would be based on a legal rule that denies recovery to the plaintiff, even if the facts
alleged by the plaintiff are true. See FED. R. Crv. P. 59(c). The Supreme Court's recent
decision in Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011, 1013 (2000), illustrates the point that
judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when no reasonable jury could find for the plaintiff
on the facts presented. In Weisgram, the federal appellate court ruled that expert testimony
offered by the plaintiffs at trial was improperly admitted by the trial judge. Id. The plaintiffs
argued that they should be afforded a new trial because at the first trial, they had relied upon
the admissibility of the expert testimony. Id. at 1013-14. In a unanimous opinion, the
Supreme Court found that the appellate court could enter judgment as a matter of law against
the plaintiffs based on the lower court's finding that the remainder of the plaintiffs' evidence
was insufficient to prove liability. Id. at 1014.
29. See Murphy, Constitutional Authority of Juries, supra note 10, at 765-66
(providing a constitutional rationale for the legitimacy of ajudgment that is contrary to ajury
verdict of liability).
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
31. With excessive damages, a plaintiffs option to proceed to a new trial is not as
inefficient as it seems, because there are strong incentives for the plaintiff to decline a new
trial in favor of accepting a lesser amount set by the court. The plaintiff still "wins" upon
accepting a reduced amount. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. A plaintiff that
has presented an insufficient case on liability, by contrast, would typically choose to proceed
with a new trial if given the chance, because there is no win for the plaintiff without either a
new trial or a settlement induced by the threat of a new trial.
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appropriate amount of noneconomic or punitive damages in the way
that it can be sure of whether liability has been proven.
Nonetheless, there are situations when a court could find that
judgment as a matter of law on damages is required.32 Federal courts
have entered judgment as a matter of law on damages when a legal
rule dictated an alteration of the jury's verdict. Specifically, courts
have modified jury awards because a legal rule invalidated an
identifiable amount of the award. Examples include the reduction
pursuant to a statutory cap of ajury award of compensatory or punitive
damages,,3 the striking of interest included in a jury award when
interest was not permitted by law,34 and the disallowance of damages
against an insurance company beyond the limits of an insurance
policy.35 Some courts have also granted nominal damages when the
jury had not made an award, because a statutory or constitutional rule
compelled some kind of relief.36 The foregoing are examples of the ex
32. I address cases in which the court altered the amount of the jury's award in
ordering judgment as a matter of law, not cases where the court entered judgment as a matter
of law because of disagreement with the jury's liability decision or because the evidence did
not support the kind of monetary award at issue. See, e.g., Silor v. Romero, 868 F.2d 1419,
1422-23 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that the evidence was not sufficient to support an award of
lost profits and upholding judgment as a matter of law on that portion of the jury award).
33. See, e.g., Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Fed. Express Corp., No. CV 97-9155-
CAS(BQRx), 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21313, at *18-*20 (C.D. Cal. June 19, 1998) (stating
that judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when the Warsaw Convention limits the
amount of damages to which the plaintiff is entitled), aff'd, 189 F.3d 914 (9th Cir. 1999). I
have previously raised questions about the validity of statutory caps on compensatory
damages and argued that categorizing a statutory cap as a legal rule does not itself answer
whether such caps are constitutional. Colleen P. Murphy, Determining Compensation: The
Tension Between Legislative Power and Jury Authority, 74 TEX. L. REv. 345, 379-410
(1995). Federal courts generally have assumed that statutory caps are consistent with the
Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989); Davis
v. Omitowoju, 883 F.2d 1155, 1165 (3d Cir. 1989); cf. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518
U.S. 415, 429 n.9 (1996) (noting that the Supreme Court has not addressed whether caps
violate the Seventh Amendment); id. at 439-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A state-law ceiling
on allowable damages ... fixed by a dollar limit ... is a substantive rule of decision that
federal courts must apply in diversity cases. . . .').
34. See, e.g., N.Y., Lake Erie & W. R.R. Co. v. Estill, 147 U.S. 591 (1893)
(upholding the compensatory damages award rendered by the jury, but denying the award of
interest from the time the suit was brought).
35. See, e.g., Ins. Co. v. Piaggio, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 378,386-88(1872) (holding that
the jury committed legal error in awarding damages beyond the amount due on an insurance
policy plus interest, and that the court could enter judgment disallowing those damages rather
than order a new trial, which "would lead to unnecessary delay and expense"); Westchester
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hanley, 284 F.2d 409,418 (6th Cir. 1960) (finding that rather than ordering a
new trial, the court could reduce the jury's award of damages against the insurance company
by twenty-five percent, where the jury had not given effect to the insurance policy provision
that the company would be liable for only seventy-five percent of the insured's loss).
36. Tee, e.g., Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that the
court's award of nominal damages did not violate the jury's province under the Seventh
Vol. 75:459466
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post application of a legal rule to the jury's verdict; the legal rule in
each instance did not supply a means to determine the proper amount
of relief before the jury deliberated.
Courts also have entered judgment as a matter of law on the
amount of damages, both before and after a jury assessment, when the
facts could support no other result-specifically, when the plaintiff
sought damages that were fixed at a sum certain or that could be made
certain by computation. Examples include judgment as a matter of
law on damages for a discrete item of economic loss" and on back pay
owed to an employee.38 Courts have both decreased and increased
jury awards as a matter of law when the proper amount was a sum
certain." The Second Circuit, which affirmed a lower court's addition
of the amount of a hospital bill to a jury's award, explained why
judgment as a matter of law was appropriate and not in violation of the
Seventh Amendment: "The district court did not divine a figure ....
It simply adjusted the jury award to account for a discrete item that
manifestly should have been part of the damage calculations and as to
whose amount there was no dispute."4
Thus, alteration of ajury's award of damages "as a matter of law"
has meant either that the court is compelled by a legal rule to adjust the
award to a specific sum, or that the facts are so one-sided that a
reasonable jury could come to but one conclusion on the proper
amount. In the latter situation, the court's decision to alter the jury's
award is functionally similar to a decision that the plaintiff has failed
to prove liability-in both contexts, the court is sure that the jury has
produced the wrong answer. When it is not possible for a court to be
convinced of the one "right answer" on damages, then the only
procedural avenues under the Seventh Amendment for correcting an
Amendment); Taylor v. Green, 868 F.2d 162, 165 (5th Cir. 1989); see also 12 MOORE, supra
note 3, § 59.13[2][g], at 59-80 to 59-81 (recognizing authority from two circuits allowing for
nominal damages to be added under appropriate statutory rules).
37. For example, the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court's addition of an
undisputed amount of a hospital bill to ajury's award. Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264,
272-73 (2d Cir. 1999).
38. See, e.g., EEOC v. Massey Yardley Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244,
1252-53 (11th Cir. 1997) (correcting a jury's calculation of the back pay owed to the
plaintiff).
39. See 12 MOORE, supra note 3, § 59.13[2][g][i][C], at 59-78 to 59-81 (discussing
additur).
40. Liriano, 170 F.3d at 272-73. The Supreme Court has held that additur, unlike
remittitur, violates the Seventh Amendment, Dimickv. Schiedt 293 U.S. 474,485-87 (1935),
although the Court has recently hinted that it might rethink the question. See Gasperini v. Ctr.
for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 433 n.16 (1996).
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excessive jury award are a remittitur accepted by the plaintiff or a new
trial.
L. REDUCING ExCEssIvE PUNITIVE DAMAGES
In reviewing punitive damages awards for excessiveness, some
federal courts have broken with the traditional doctrine that a court
may not reduce a jury award of uncertain damages without the
plaintiff's consent.4 The Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits recently
have directed entry ofjudgment as a matter of law on reduced awards
of punitive damages.42 The Third and Eleventh Circuits took this
action after the Supreme Court's reaffirmation of the traditional
doctrine with respect to compensatory damages in Hezel. Only the
Eleventh Circuit, in Johansen v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., gave
attention to whether its action was consistent with the Seventh
Amendment.43 The court's conclusion that the Amendment did not
prohibit judgment as a matter of law was rooted in the fact that the jury
award was deemed excessive under federal constitutional standards,
rather than under nonconstitutional standards." In contrast, the Tenth
Circuit, when faced with an unconstitutionally excessive punitive
award, concluded that "[tio avoid any conflict with the Seventh
Amendment, the preferable [course] is to afford the party ... the
option of either accepting the remittitur of the punitive damages award
or a new trial on that issue.' 45
To evaluate whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate
when a punitive damages award is deemed excessive, it is helpful to
identify the different sources of law that might control the
excessiveness inquiry. The common law provides limits on punitive
damages awards, under standards such as whether the award "shocks
the judicial conscience" or is unreasonable in light of the punitive and
deterrent purposes of the award." Deviating from common law
standards, at least one federal appellate court has stated that a district
court should make an "independent judgment" on the amount of
punitive damages and depart from the jury's award "to the extent that
it concludes that its own comparative advantages warrant such a
41. However, several courts follow the traditional rule that a court may reduce ajury
award only with the consent of the plaintiff. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
43. 170 F.3d 1320, 1333-35 (11th Cir. 1999).
44. Id. at 1331.
45. Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 643 (10th Cir. 1996)
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1258-59 (9th Cir.
1993)).
46. See 12 MOORE, supra note 3, § 59.13[2][g], at 59-75 to 59-87.
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departure." 7 Statutes may also provide standards on how to judge
excessiveness. 4' Finally, federal due process doctrine constrains the
amount of punitive damages awards.49
In a series of cases culminating in BMW ofNorth America, Inc. v.
Gore, the Supreme Court has indicated that a "grossly excessive"
punitive damages award violates due process." This is because due
process requires that "a person receive fair notice not only of the
conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of
the penalty that a State may impose."" In BMW, the Supreme Court
articulated three "guideposts" for reviewing whether a jury's punitive
damages award violates due process: the degree of reprehensibility of
the defendant's conduct, the ratio between compensatory damages and
punitive damages, and the difference between punitive damages and
the "civil or criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparable
misconduct.""2
In theory, nonconstitutional review under common law or
statutory standards differs from constitutional review under due
process." A punitive damages award might be considered excessive
under nonconstitutional standards but fall short of being so excessive
47. Atlas Food Sys. & Sews., Inc. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587,595 (4th
Cir. 1996).
48. See, e.g., ARm. CODE ANN. § 16-64-123 (Michie 1987) ('The verdict of any jury
rendered in any action for the recovery of damages where the measure thereof is
indeterminate or uncertain shall not be held to be excessive or be set aside as excessive,
except for some erroneous instruction or, upon evidence, aside from the amount of the
damages assessed, that it was rendered under the influence of passion or prejudice."); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(b)-(c) (1997) (listing several factors that ajudge should consider in
reviewing a jury award of punitive damages). Statutes also may cap the amount of punitive
damages that may be awarded in certain types of cases, but such statutes set forth limits of
liability rather than standards for how to judge excessiveness in individual cases.
49. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
50. 517 U.S. at 574-75.
51. Id. at 562, 574-75.
52. Id. at 574-83.
53. At least a few members of the Supreme Court have explicitly recognized a
distinction between common law review for reasonableness and review as to whether an
award violates the due process clause. As a plurality of the Court noted in a decision a few
years before BMW. "A violation of a state law 'reasonableness' requirement would not...
necessarily establish that the award is so 'grossly excessive' as to violate the Federal
Constitution." TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 n.24 (1993)
(plurality opinion). The Supreme Court, however, has confused matters by describing review
under due process in terms of "reasonableness." See, e.g., BAfW, 517 U.S. at 582-83 ("[A]
general concern[] of reasonableness ... properly enter[s] into the constitutional calculus."
(alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499
U.S. 1, 18 (1991))).
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as to constitute a due process violation.54 Lower federal courts,
however, have exhibited differing perspectives on constitutional and
nonconstitutional review. Some lower courts explicitly distinguish
review under due process from review under common law or statutory
standards. 55 Other courts expressly use the BMWguideposts to decide
whether a punitive award should be set aside under the "shock the
judicial conscience" standard and other nonconstitutional tests. 6 Still
other courts, without citing BMW, use standards for nonconstitutional
review that mirror the BMW guideposts, such as the reprehensibility of
54. Because of the high bar for concluding that an award is so excessive as to deny
the defendant fair notice, "[punitive awards so high as to be unconstitutional ought to be
rare." Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Predictability of Punitive Damages
Awards in Published Opinions, the Impact ofBMW v. Gore on Punitive Damages Awards,
and Forecasting Which Punitive Awards Will Be Reduced, 7 Sup. Cr. ECON. REv. 59, 75
(1999). Professors Eisenberg and Wells have demonstrated that in the year after the Supreme
Court's decision in BMW, the case had little effect on the patterns of punitive damages
awards in published opinions. Id. at 75-83. The authors comment: "It may be that
insufficient time has elapsed for BMW's effect to be fully felt. But it also may be that the
case is of less practical importance than some believe. BMWis a constitutional decision and
one should not expect the Constitution to play a role in routine punitive damages cases." Id.
at 83.
55. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-2122, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
33144, at *15-*16 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 1999) (finding that the award did not "shock the
conscience" or violate due process); Mason v. Okla. Tpk. Auth., 182 F.3d 1212, 1214 (10th
Cir. 1999) (indicating that the defendant could not raise a constitutional challenge because it
was not asserted below); Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1331 (11 th Cir.
1999) (distinguishing a punitive damages award that violates due process and thus is not
permitted as a matter of law from an award that is "unreasonable on the facts'); Visionquest
Nat'l, Ltd. v. Marimed Found., No. 97-15014, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 15340, at *2-*3 (9th
Cir. July 6, 1998) (noting that punitive damages "would survive common law or
constitutional review for excessiveness"); FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 860-62 (1Oth Cir.
1997) (ruling that the amount of the punitive award violated due process and state law); Riley
v. Kurtz, No. 98-1077, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24341, at *20-*25 (6th Cir. 1999) (reviewing
a punitive award first under BMW for whether it violates the Fourteenth Amendment and
then under the common law for whether the award "shocks the conscience"); Deffenbaugh-
Williams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 156 F.3d 581, 597 (5th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing
nonconstitutional from constitutional review but asserting that BMW is "instructive for
reviewing other excessiveness claims for punitive damages').
56. See, e.g., Deffenbaugh-Williams, 156 F.3d at 597 ("[A]lthough BMW concerns
constitutional limits, it is instructive for reviewing other excessiveness claims for punitive
damages.'); Lee v. Edwards, 101 F.3d 805, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1996) (using BMWguideposts to
determine whether a punitive award "shock[ed] our judicial conscience" and considering
awards in comparable cases to determine the appropriate amount of remittitur); Leab v.
Cincinnati Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.95-5690, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8868, at *41-*53 (E.D. Pa.
June 23, 1997) (using BMWguideposts to determine whether punitive award was "so large as
to shock the conscience of the court"); Creative Demos, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 955 F.
Supp. 1032, 1041-44 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying BMWguideposts to decide whether the jury
awarded excessive damages under state and federal standards), vacated by 142 F.3d 367 (7th
Cir. 1998); Geuss v. Pfizer, Inc., 971 F. Supp. 164, 176-78 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (applying BMW
guideposts to determine whether the punitive damages award was excessive).
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the defendant's conduct and the ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages.5
7
I suggest that regardless of the type of review, the Seventh
Amendment generally prohibits a court from reducing a punitive
damages award without offering the plaintiff the option of a new trial.
With the exception of reduction pursuant to a statutory cap,58 outright
reduction of punitive damages does not fall within either of the
categories in which judgment as a matter of law is appropriate. No
legal rule exists that dictates the amount of punitive damages, and
reasonable juries likely would reach varying conclusions on the proper
amount of relief. Nonetheless, because some courts have assumed the
propriety of judgment as a matter of law on the amount of punitive
damages, it is worth considering the arguments that have been, or
might be, offered in support of the practice.
One argument in favor of judgment as a matter of law might be
that an award of punitive damages is not a "fact tried by a jury" and
thus does not fall within the prohibition of the Seventh Amendment
that "no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined [except]
according to the rules of the common law."59 In other contexts, courts
have characterized decisions on the amount of punitive damages to be
decisions more of policy than of fact.6" An argument that the
57. See, e.g., Thome v. Welk Inv., Inc., 197 F.3d 1205, 1211 (8th Cir. 1999)
(considering the reprehensibility of the defendant and the ratio between compensatory and
punitive damages); EEOC v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 187 F.3d 1241, 1249 (10th Cir. 1999)
(examining the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, the ratio between punitive and
compensatory damages, and the difference between the punitive award and comparable
statutory remedies to determine whether the award "shock[ed] the judicial conscience!);
Kimbrough v. Loma Linda Dev., Inc., 183 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir. 1999) (using the ratio
between the compensatory and punitive damages and reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct to determine whether punitive award was excessive); Adgate v. Robinson Ford
Sales, No. 98-55784, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2815, at *7-*8 (9th Cir. 2000) (considering the
ratio between punitive and compensatory damages in deciding whether the award was
excessive under state law); Riley, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 24341, at *20-*25 (finding a
review of BMW factors inconclusive as to whether due process was violated by large punitive
award, the court performed a common law review and, without citing BMW, relied on the
ratio between punitive and actual damages to conclude that the award "shocked the
conscience"); Lambert v. Ackerley, 180 F.3d 997, 1011 n.15 (9thCir. 1999), cert. denied, 120
S. Ct. 936 (2000) (taking into account the defendant's reprehensibility and financial assets in
determining that a punitive damages award was not excessive).
58. See supra note 33.
59. U.S. CoNsr. amend. VII.
60. See, e.g., Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,459 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) ("Unlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents a question of
historical or predictive fact, the level of punitive damages is not really a 'fact' 'tried' by the
jury." (citation omitted)); Atlas Food Sys. & Serv. v. Crane Nat'l Vendors, Inc., 99 F.3d 587,
594 (4th Cir. 1996) ("The jury's determination of the amount of punitive damages.., is not a
factual determination about the degree of injury but is, rather, an almost unconstrained
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assessment of punitive damages should not be considered a question
of fact for purposes ofjudicial review, however, would be at odds with
the prevailing doctrine that the Seventh Amendment guarantees jury
assessment of punitive damages in the first instance.' It would be
inconsistent to treat the assessment of punitive damages as a question
of fact for the jury initially, but not as a question of fact for purposes of
judicial review.
Another argument is that courts determine "as a matter of law"
whether an award of punitive damages is excessive, and thus courts
should be able to reduce an excessive award outright. This argument
was advanced by the Eleventh Circuit in Johansen, in the context of an
award deemed to be excessive under due process. 2 To characterize
the reduction of the punitive award as a question of law, Johansen
asserted that "[n]o one would dispute that the court, not the jury, has
the responsibility for determining [the] constitutional limit." 3 To be
sure, the decision whether a jury's award is excessive is a question of
law for a court to determine; the Supreme Court has recognized this to
be true whether the legal maximum of the award is governed by
judgment or policy choice about the severity of the penalty to be imposed, given the jury's
underlying factual determinations about the defendant's conduct."); cf. Cont'l Trend Res.,
Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 642-43 (10th Cir. 1996) (finding that the appellate court
could review ajury's award of punitive damages because the question of excessiveness was
one of constitutional fact under due process).
61. Current doctrine assumes that the Seventh Amendment guarantees jury
assessment of punitive damages as an initial matter. See, e.g., Klinger v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 115 F.3d 230, 235-36 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that the Seventh Amendment
guarantees jury assessment of punitive damages in a bad faith action against an insurer);
Defender Indus., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 938 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1991)
(en banc) (stating that the "[S]eventh [A]mendment guarantees the right to a jury
determination of the amount of punitive damages"); see also Murphy, Judicial Assessment,
supra note 10, at 169 n.103 (citing additional cases in state courts interpreting state
constitutional guarantees to jury trial). The Supreme Court's opinion in Feltner v. Columbia
Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 347 (1998), a case finding that the Seventh
Amendment guarantees jury assessment of the amount of statutory damages in copyright
cases, makes it unlikely that the current Court would find that the assessment of punitive
damages falls outside the ambit of the Seventh Amendment. Although I have made
arguments elsewhere that the Seventh Amendment should not be interpreted to require that
juries assess punitive damages as an initial matter, see supra note 10, my discussion in this
Essay on whether judgment as a matter of law is permissible on the amount of punitive
damages assumes that courts will continue to interpret the Seventh Amendment as
guaranteeing initial jury determination of such damages.
62. Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1330-31 (1Ith Cir. 1999)
("Neither common law nor the Seventh Amendment, however, prohibits reexamination of the
verdict for legal error. Therefore, if legal error is detected, the federal courts have the
obligation and the power to correct the error by vacating or reversing the jury's verdict,"
(citation omitted) (footnote omitted)).
63. Id. at 1331.
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constitutional or nonconstitutional standards.' 4 But it is quite a
different matter to conclude, as Johansen did, that the court
accordingly may enter absolute judgment reducing the jury award to
the legal maximum." The Supreme Court in Hetzel v. Prince William
County rejected such an approach.66 Hetzel reaffirmed that, when a
jury award exceeds the upper limit permissible under nonconstitutional
standards, the cure is a new trial, with the court having the option of
offering a remittitur to the plaintiff.67
There seems little reason why the response to an excessive jury
award should be absolute judgment on a reduced amount simply
because the standard for determining excessiveness is provided by
constitutional law, as opposed to statutory or common law. The
defendant's due process right not to be subject to a grossly excessive
award can be vindicated without abridging the plaintiff's Seventh
Amendment right to have a jury determine the amount of uncertain
damages. The respective constitutional rights of the defendant and the
plaintiff can be served by vacating the jury's excessive award and
granting a new trial. If the court also offers a remittitur to the plaintiff
in an amount the court determines to be the maximum permissible
under due process, then the plaintiff would proceed with a new trial
only at great risk. The plaintiff could earn an award at a new trial
greater than the amount previously set by the reviewing court only if
the plaintiff achieved the difficult task of putting on proof that justified
a higher constitutional maximum.
In attempting to cast the reduction of an unconstitutionally
excessive award as a matter of law outside the ambit of the Seventh
Amendment, Johansen relied on the power of courts to alter awards
that include "an identifiable amount that is not permitted by law."'68 It
cited as support the Supreme Court's decision in New York, Lake Erie
& Western Railroad Co. v. Estill, which upheld a lower court's
exclusion of interest improperly awarded by the jury.69 But Estill
64. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437-38.
65. See Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1331 ("The real issue, therefore, is whether the court
may enter judgment for a constitutionally reduced award without plaintiff's consent. So put,
the question answers itself. Plaintiff's consent is irrelevant if the Constitution requires the
reduction.").
66. Hetzel v. Prince William County, 523 U.S. 208,211 (1998).
67. Id.
68. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1330.
69. 147 U.S. 591, 621-22 (1893). In Estill, the Supreme Court found that the jury
improperly awarded interest. Id. It affirmed the jury's award for damages, but directed that
the 'judgment is modified as to such interest, and the case is remanded to the court below,
with a direction to enter ajudgment for the plaintiffs for [the damages]." Id. at 622 (emphasis
omitted).
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merely exemplifies the uncontroversial proposition that a court may
enter judgment as a matter of law, on either liability or damages, when
a legal rule dictates a certain result.7" Determining the "constitutional
maximum" for a punitive damages award is not subject to similar
certainty, because the setting of that maximum is infused with factual
decisions about the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; no
legal rule exists to inform the court of the precise constitutional limit.
The difference between an award that is excessive under a
definite legal rule and an award that is excessive under constitutional
standards is demonstrated by comparing how a new trial on remedy
might aid the plaintiff. With a jury award that improperly includes
interest, for example, there is nothing that a plaintiff could do at a new
trial that would change the legal conclusion that interest is unavailable.
Judgment as a matter of law, excising the "identifiable amount that is
not permitted by law," thus makes practical sense.7 With an award of
punitive damages, however, there is the possibility that the plaintiff
might be able to put on proof at a new trial that would alter a
reviewing court's perception of the constitutional maximum.72  At
retrial, the plaintiff might establish that the defendant's conduct was
more reprehensible than was proven at the first trial. This possibility is
significant, for the Supreme Court in BMW stated that the degree of
reprehensibility is "[p]erhaps the most important indicium of the
reasonableness of a punitive damages award."73 In addition, there is
the possibility (although perhaps remote) that proof about the
defendant's conduct at a new trial would cause the reviewing court to
look to a different set of civil and criminal penalties for comparison
with the punitive award than were considered after the first trial. A
new trial might also affect the reviewing court's perception of whether
the ratio between compensatory and punitive damages is too high,
even though the new trial might be limited to the issue of punitive
damages.74 The award of punitive damages in a new trial might be as
70. See id. at 621-22.
71. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1330.
72. This analysis contradicts the assertion in Johansen that "[g]iving a plaintiff the
option of a new trial rather than accepting the constitutional maximum for this case would be
of no value." Id. at 1332 n.19. Although Johansen contends that "[i]f the plaintiff obtained
more than the constitutional maximum [at a new trial], the award could not be sustained," it
is possible that the plaintiff could put on proof at the new trial that would justify a higher
constitutional maximum. Id. (emphasis omitted).
73. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,575 (1996).
74. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59(a) (authorizing the grant of a new trial "on all or part of the
issues" already tried); see also Cont'l Trend Res., Inc. v. Oxy USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 643
(10th Cir. 1996) (offering a remittitur on punitive damages found to be constitutionally
474 [Vol. 75:459
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LA W
large or larger than in the first trial, but a reviewing court might
nonetheless find the ratio between punitive and compensatory damages
to be acceptable based on proof at the new trial concerning the
defendant's conduct.' Thus, reducing outright an unconstitutionally
excessive punitive award cannot be likened to excising an "identifiable
amount" of ajury award that is "not permitted by law."'76
Beyond the arguments that the assessment of punitive damages is
not a question of fact and that determining the excessiveness of an
award is a question of law, there is the argument, advanced by
Johansen, that the reduction of a punitive award to the constitutional
maximum is not a remittitur, and thus a new trial need not be offered.77
The court in Johansen labeled a constitutional reduction as mandatory,
but a remittitur as discretionary.7" It also characterized a constitutional
reduction as "a determination that the law does not permit the award,"
while it labeled a remittitur as the product of a court's determination
that "the jury's award is unreasonable on the facts."'79
Johansen drew a false dichotomy between a "mandatory"
constitutional reduction and a "discretionary" remittitur. The proper
comparison is between entering judgment as a matter of law and
ordering a new trial (which carries with it the discretion to offer the
plaintiff a remittitur). As noted earlier, a court has the mandatory
obligation to order a new trial if it finds a jury award of uncertain
damages to be excessive; remittitur is discretionary in the sense that
the court could simply order a new trial without offering the plaintiff a
remittitur. Contrary to Johansen's characterization, the requirement of
offering the plaintiff a new trial does not proceed from the decision to
offer a remittitur.8 ° Rather, the possibility of a remittitur flows from
the mandatory obligation to order a new trial when a jury award is
excessive but stating that if the plaintiffs declined to accept the reduced amount, the district
court should grant a new trial limited to the issue of punitive damages).
75. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 582-83 (indicating that the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct should inform a court's decision as to whether the ratio between
compensatory and punitive damages is within a constitutionally acceptable range).
76. Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1330.
77. Seeid.at1331.
78. Id. ("Unlike a remittitur, which is discretionary with the court and which we
review for an abuse of discretion, a court has a mandatory duty to correct an
unconstitutionally excessive verdict so that it conforms to the requirements of the due process
clause." (citations omitted)).
79. Id. (emphasis omitted). Further drawing a distinction between a constitutional
reduction and a remittitur, the Eleventh Circuit commented that, while an appellate court
should review a remittitur under an abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court should
review a constitutional reduction de novo, because whether the award is constitutionally
excessive is a legal issue. Id. at 1334.
80. See 11 WRIGHTErAL., supra note 15, § 2815, at 159-60.
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excessive.81 Moreover, although a court's choice to offer a remittitur is
discretionary, determining the proper amount of the remittitur is not.
The Seventh Amendment has been interpreted by modem courts and
influential authorities alike to require that, if a court offers a remittitur,
the amount of the reduction should be to the maximum the jury
lawfully could have awarded. 2 A court that offers a remittitur must
determine the maximum award permitted by common or statutory law,
just as a court that has concluded that an award is unconstitutionally
excessive must, if it wants to reduce the award, determine the
maximum permitted by constitutional law.83 Thus, for purposes of
determining whether a court can enter absolute judgment on the
"maximum" set by the court, a remittitur according to
nonconstitutional standards is not functionally distinguishable from a
reduction according to constitutional standards.
Johansen was also unpersuasive in suggesting that a
constitutional reduction can be distinguished from a remittitur on the
basis that the former embodies a legal conclusion, but the latter reflects
a court's review of the facts. A conclusion that a jury award is
excessive, whether under constitutional or nonconstitutional standards,
generally involves an evaluation of both the law and the facts. To find
that a punitive damages award violates due process requires
consideration of the facts of the defendant's reprehensibility; to find
that a damages award is "unreasonable on the facts" requires the
application of some common law or statutory standard to judge
excessiveness.
Yet another argument to validate the outright reduction of an
unconstitutionally excessive award is that BMW casts doubt on
whether the plaintiff must have the option of a new trial.84 In
Johansen, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that the "Supreme Court itself
recognized" that "[n]o new trial need be offered" when a punitive
damages award is deemed excessive under due process.85 Johansen
observed that the Court in BMW remanded the case to the state
supreme court to determine "[w]hether the appropriate remedy
81. See id.
82. Id. § 2815, at 167-68 (discussing various theories and court approaches to how to
determine the amount of a remittitur, but asserting that the maximum recovery rule "is the
only theory that has any reasonable claim of being consistent with the Seventh
Amendment"); 12 MooRE, supra note 3, § 59.13(2)(g), at 59-86 (stating that "setting the
final judgment amount at anything less than the maximum legal award may violate the
Seventh Amendment").
83. See 11 WRIGHTrETAL.,supra note 15, § 2815, at 167-68.
84. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586 (1996).
85. Johansen v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 170 F.3d 1320, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
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requires a new trial or merely an independent determination by the
Alabama Supreme Court of the award necessary to vindicate the
economic interests of Alabama consumers." 6 This statement by the
Supreme Court, however, must be read in the procedural context of the
case. The Supreme Court found only that the punitive award was
excessive under due process; it did not further determine the
constitutional maximum." Thus, the Supreme Court's remand
directions can be read as simply leaving to the Alabama high court the
choice of ordering a new trial or determining for itself the upper limit
permitted by due process.88 The Supreme Court did not suggest what
the procedural consequence should be (absolute judgment or remittitur
with the option of a new trial) if the state supreme court chose to
determine the constitutional limit.89 The Court's failure to comment
on this point is unsurprising because the Seventh Amendment does not
apply to the states.9" BMW thus provides little, if any, support for the
Johansen conclusion that federal courts may order absolute judgment
on the amount of punitive damages.
Even if one were to accept the proposition that judgment as a
matter of law is appropriate on the constitutional maximum of a
punitive damages award, there is the practical problem of
distinguishing awards in which the constitutional maximum has been
surpassed from awards that are merely excessive under
nonconstitutional standards. Johansen commented that "if the district
court exercises its discretion to reduce the verdict lower than the
constitutional maximum for that case, the verdict has been
'reexamined' and the plaintiff must be afforded the option to elect a
new trial."'91 Under the Johansen reasoning, a court wanting to reduce
an award and avoid the possibility of a new trial would seek to
86. Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting BMW, 517 U.S. at 586).
87. See BMW,517 U.S. at 585-86.
88. See id.
89. See id. Johansen found it significant that the Supreme Court in BMWdid not use
the term "remittitur" to characterize a constitutionally required reduction in a verdict, but that
Hetzel did refer to the Fourth Circuit's reduction of the jury's verdict as a remittitur. See
Johansen, 170 F.3d at 1331 n. 15. There was no reason for the Supreme Court to use the term
"remittitur" in BMW, however, because the Court did not itself set an upper limit for punitive
damages in the case; it simply found the amount awarded to be unconstitutionally excessive
and then remanded for further proceedings.
90. See, e.g., Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90, 92-93 (1875) (stating that "[t]he States,
so far as this amendment is concerned, are left to regulate trials in their own courts in their
own way"). But cf. In re Bd. of County Sup'rs, 143 F.3d 835, 840 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating
that the Supreme Court's remand instructions in BMW were "for reasons unrelated to
incorporation insofar as appears from the opinion").
91. Johansen, 170F.3dat 1332n.20.
2000] 477
TULANE LA WPREVIEWV
characterize the award as unconstitutionally excessive, rather than
merely unreasonable.
As discussed earlier, there are, in theory, different standards for
constitutional and nonconstitutional review of the amount of a punitive
damages award. We have seen, however, that courts commonly
conflate the two types of review, making it difficult to draw any
meaningful line between unconstitutionally excessive awards and
merely unreasonable ones.9" Moreover, the BMW guideposts are so
indeterminate that a reviewing court would have substantial leeway to
characterize an excessive award as unconstitutional, rather than simply
invalid under nonconstitutional standards. Thus, the exception that
Johansen sought to establish for unconstitutionally excessive punitive
damages has the potential to swallow the rule against outright
reductions ofjury awards.
The arguments for outright reduction of excessive punitive
awards fail to reconcile such a procedure with the prerequisites for
entering judgment as a matter of law-either that a legal rule dictates a
certain outcome or that there is but one conclusion a reasonable jury
could reach on the facts. Moreover, none of the arguments justify
departure from the Seventh Amendment doctrine that an excessive
jury award of uncertain damages may be corrected only by a new trial
or by a remittitur accepted by the plaintiff.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Seventh Amendment embodies the principle that juries,
rather than judges, are to determine the amount of uncertain damages
within lawful limits. When a jury has rendered an excessive award,
the plaintiffs opportunity to have a new jury determine damages
preserves the constitutional principle. A court that enters judgment as
a matter of law on a reduced punitive award sacrifices this principle
for little practical gain. A plaintiff has powerful incentives to accept a
remittitur if offered a choice between a new trial and the reduced
amount that the court determines to be the lawful maximum. A court's
refusal to offer the plaintiff the option of a new trial may, at best,
achieve some efficiency at the margins for the litigants and the justice
system. The more troubling-and unconstitutional-result is that the
92. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text. For example, the reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct is relevant to both nonconstitutional and constitutional review.
This factor thus could not easily distinguish the unconstitutionally excessive award from the
merely unreasonable award.
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court, rather than a jury, has become the principal decision maker on
the amount of damages.
* * *
